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Abstract. The paper employs different definitions of inequality/ equality and investigates 
how globalisation is associated with these welfare measures. The nations’ proximity to post 
modernism development culture through international cooperation may enable countries to 
strengthen their social, economic, legal and political institutions. We find that adopting well 
developed institutional governance practices as matter of greater integration with modern 
21st century governance culture creates thriving middle classes in developing countries 
enabling a downward pressure on inequality of incomes and wages. In contrast, integration 
of goods and services with world markets puts upward pressure on the wages of skilled in 
contrast with the unskilled causing industrial wage inequalities in both developed and 
developing countries. The paper recommends in line with the recent literature on pre 
mature de industrialisation phenomenon that countries may protect their local industries to 
provide jobs to locals and thus enable the gains of trade to be more equally distributed 
among the populations. This can be done by choosing the second best option towards global 
integration and that is to promote regionalism within geographical clusters. 
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‚No one should be worried about greater inequality so long as everybody’s income is 
increasing. It is only with incomes of those who are poor that economists need to be 
concerned: This is an argument not infrequently heard. As some one who has worked on 
the issues of inequality for more than twenty years, I had had a chance to see it expressed 
quite a few times‛ (Milanovic, 2003: 2). 
 
1. Introduction 
oday it has become cliché to say that the world is a global village. One may 
ask, what are the social and economic characteristics of this global village 
when around the globe, information is just a click away for individuals or is 
increasingly available to them via their local, regional or global media outlets? As 
one looks through the eyes of the media, it seems that the world is ever dividing 
into conflicting political and social ideologies as different interest groups strive for 
different realities. Nevertheless here one can safely say that economics has been 
resolute to bring a single mutually acceptable point of reference to different 
stakeholders; connecting the concepts of fair globalisation with economic 
empowerment, freedom of speech, human rights and preservation of environment. 
Unlike in business ethics, in economics, not all is about profit making, but about 
maintaining efficiency while harnessing social harmony.  
However, what is good economics is still a question to be given a wholesome 
answer. Economic freedom has leaded the world closer in many ways. One way is 
that global inequalities have become evident more than ever. The world is more 
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dividing not only on basis of mere ideologies but more importantly there is 
unequal distribution of economic gains. Developed countries have gained more in 
recent decades than developing countries. But they also trade among each other 
freely and enjoy precedence of good institutions with populations who are on 
average more educated than the populations in developing countries. Developing 
countries on the other hand suffer from underdeveloped institutions and trade and 
commerce is still in many cases (i.e., Sub Saharan Africa) an underdeveloped 
concept and more so because of the presence of many internal conflicts based on 
ethnicity, language or religion. On average, developing countries are hostile 
among each other when compared to developed countries and that can be the 
legacy of cold war which ended in 1991 with dismantling of Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR).1 
Irrespective of negative fallout of cold war, and with the end of it in 1990s, a 
new era started which is now better known as the post Washington consensus 
period, which saw an increased call of globalisation by asking developing 
countries to decrease their protection in order to be an integral part of a growing 
global demand and supply chains. More trade and economic cooperation among 
developed and developing countries had been seen as one of the best ways through 
which incomes in developing countries would converge to the levels of their 
developed counterparts. The focus of recipes of development ever since had been 
on income generation. The question of distribution of incomes was largely never 
asked only until recently when there is a significant rise in global income 
inequality (i.e. see Milanovic, 2006; and Wade, 2004; for a detailed discussion on 
global income inequality).  Rise in global inequalities is seen to be linked with 
prevalent inequalities among different strata of population within countries which 
stifle the potential of a country to grow or converge. (A discussion of intra-country 
inequality has already been carried out in chapter 3, and which is the focus of the 
larger thesis and this chapter also).  
In most of the last 20 years, the criterion of good economic policy and the 
barometer of good governance focused itself on their effects on per capita income 
growth in developing countries.  Economic efficiency models were transferred to 
many developing countries who had become adherents to the Washington 
consensus. Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) is the most well known one of the 
recommended programs of economic development, which has been implemented 
in many developing countries with the help of Bretton Woods’s institutions like 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
As per the good advice of Bretton Woods’s institutions and in an effort to 
achieve economic efficiency, most developing countries dismantled their barriers 
to international trade in goods and services during the last 20 years. As a result, the 
size of world trade in goods and services dramatically increased. Success stories 
also emerged as an outcome of contemporary globalisation. China and India, 
witnessed unprecedented rise in their growth rates as well as significant poverty 
alleviation. However, for most countries, globalisation came with mixed 
experiences.  Despite integration to the world economy, most countries of Latin 
America, Africa (sub-Saharan) and some in Asia failed to accomplish decent 
growth rates. In many countries in the South, poverty increased. Even if some 
grew at a decent rate, they failed to put a downward pressure on the increasing 
trends in poverty levels. For example, Pakistan, which recently witnessed a growth 
rate of eight per cent, has also witnessed increase in poverty levels from 30 per 
cent to 35 per cent as of 2005. Even in China and India, the falling poverty trends 
are not sustainable, as there is evidence of rapidly rising inequalities.  
Irrespective of rising trends of poverty in some developing countries and rising 
within country inequalities in some, a more important fact is that many developing 
 
1 High military expenditures as a proportion to GDP in many developing countries indicates towards 
prevalent internal or external conflict, while high military expenditures are born at the cost of public 
exchequer by crowding out much needed development expenditures.  
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countries encountered conditions of severe economic collapse amid Structural 
Adjustment Plans. These include mostly the countries in Latin America like 
Argentina who embraced free market ideology far more intensively than any other 
country in the developing world. Surprisingly, Argentina had historically been far 
more developed per capita wise than countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, or regions like Sub Saharan Africa or Mena countries, but instead of 
converging to the developed country incomes their path to development has 
seriously been hampered by significant economic collapse post 1980s economic 
reforms and they are stagnating ever since, still struggling with one macro-
economic crises after another. 
Where did they go wrong may tell a whole lot about where do most developing 
countries have gone wrong? It is a story of good policies but bad timing. The 
policies fail because larger determinants of development are not taken into 
account. A focus on income generation without looking at prevalent institutions 
may lead to economic disaster. Mamoon & Murshed (2017) have shown that 
institutions are as important as good economic policies (i.e. trade policy). Though 
the focus in chapter 2 was on income and its determinants, the debate needs to be 
extended to income distribution which can then capture such unequal outcomes 
which prevent some segments of the societies from gaining goods of economic 
gains (rising per capita income). In developing countries, other than being poor of 
the poorest, many are relatively poorer than the others because they are 
economically and socially excluded because of their ethnic origin, religion or 
geographical region. It is observed that when these developing countries generate 
more incomes through policies like integration, the incomes are further distributed 
un-equally.  
This is the same phenomenon as global inequality; where some countries 
(regions) of the world have gained less than the other countries because of their 
geographical location, underdeveloped institutions or mere lack of economic 
capability (because of the presence of deep rooted informal markets). As 
mentioned above, with the exception of China and India, more developing 
countries have failed to alleviate poverty even though they have witnessed some 
short to medium term spurts in per capita income growth rates. The poor remained 
poor but rich got richer. Has income inequality prevented growth to trickle down 
to the poor? 
In this retrospect, the problem of poverty cannot be separated from the way in 
which growth is achieved. Other than economic growth, what is the point of 
reference to economic development, especially when it is about ensuring equity?  
Under global processes of production, where trading societies learn and 
coordinate among each other to find common ground for carrying out 
contemporary social norms that fit international standards and where business 
protects labour rights, promotes gender sensitivity, brings efficient social welfare 
systems while following best commerce practices, there are not one but a myriad 
combination of common institutions, which simultaneously play a role in 
facilitating each country’s smooth exposure to global markets and international 
competition. Thus, it is important to look at the different institutional structures 
countries may have while working along with the surge of globalisation. 
One of the most commonly quoted institutional factors for determining any 
country’s intellectual, social, economic and cultural progress is the notion of 
democracy. Since all developed nations are well-practiced democracies, this notion 
generally forms the popular opinion that democracy is the first step to any 
country’s progress. However to change the kaleidoscope a bit, one may also argue 
that it is their very own economic progress that has been able to sustain democracy 
in the West. It is a well-developed combination of social, legal, political and 
economic institutions, which has worked in an intricate net of coordination to 
sustain western economic progress, thus enabling the region to maintain its 
scientific niche. Where did the West really start it all? There are different answers 
for different times. To go down a timeline, say a hundred years, western economic 
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progress links to colonialism, which was an act of resource exploitation and 
dictatorial precedence in the garb of monarchies rather than following any course 
of democratic values. Today western economic models work under the prime of 
information accuracy and thus keep their edge over other regions based on their 
enhanced level of technology.  
In developing countries, there is evidence of rapid economic progress leading 
to democracy or moving towards democratically aligned economic models of 
governance. China, South Korea and Taiwan have been growing under one-party 
dictatorships, the last two eventually turning completely to democracy. Today 
China is for the first time seriously emphasising property rights, to protect private 
ownership, within its own borders. Among the transition economies, Kazakhstan 
under Nazarbaev achieved rapid economic growth. Here one may assume that 
these countries performed well under market-friendly policies and thus 
successfully achieved robust economic performance. However, the analogy is not 
that simple and mere good economics is not enough to sustain economic progress.  
 In 2003, Pakistan had become one of the fastest growing economies in South 
Asia, even surpassing India, under General Musharraf, and finally moving towards 
democracy while for the first time in Pakistan’s politically chequered history, 
nearly all political parties accepted the electoral verdict as an outcome of free and 
fair elections. However, the increase in political instability in the last years of 
Musharraf rule has already stifled the growth rates in the country and currently an 
economic and political crisis is looming asking whether the good policies of the 
dictators are sustainable or whether autocratic rules corrupt the prevalent 
institutions, irrespective of a possibility of short term economic good will, such 
that the period, which represents transition to democracy , would be mired with 
political upheavals which would eventually cause economic collapse. Sometimes, 
democratic transitions are risky and produce bad economic outcomes. (See Rodrik 
& Wacziarg, 2005; for a detailed discussion on this).  
 Thus market-friendly policies may not work in the absence of good 
institutions. In Russia, the lack of a supportive legal, regulatory and political 
apparatus has been responsible for the failure of the economy and its reform 
process. In Latin America, little attention paid to the mechanisms of social 
insurance and to the safety nets has resulted in dissatisfaction with market-oriented 
reforms. India, in comparison to the countries mentioned above, is not only the 
largest democracy in the world in terms of population, but the country is also one 
of the fastest growing economies in the world with a precedence of sound legal 
institutions. Due to robust legal institutions, the country is politically less volatile 
when compared to its neighbour Pakistan, even though both countries have seen an 
emergence of multiparty governance setups. However, because they are 
developing countries, much like those in Latin America, social institutions are 
underdeveloped, which means that a well-meaning democracy may not exist in 
India until economic progress reaches out to the masses and benefits the 
impoverished peripheries. It may also be the case that some institutions may be 
more important than others may. For example, even pro-market dictators can 
secure property rights as a matter of policy choice (Glaeser, 2004a). Similarly, 
stronger social institutions lead to improved government functioning: ‘Education is 
needed for courts to operate and to empower citizens to engage with government 
institutions.’ (Glaeser, 2004a) 
Why market friendly policies may fail to work under developing countries? To 
achieve higher growth rates, economic freedom is a pre-requisite condition. 
Usually, economic freedom is determined by good economic policies, which as 
discussed above can be very well a prerogative of good leadership rather than good 
institutions, especially in case of developing countries. The fundamentals of good 
economic policies lie in promotion of private sector by implementing rules like 
private property rights and decreasing the burden of public exchequer.  However, 
in developing countries the private gains may fail to follow equal distribution 
because of the presence of deep rooted social, ethnic and regional inequalities.  
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Only a democratic structure or prevalence of sound social, political and legal 
institutions may ensure or promote equal opportunities to private gains in unequal 
societies.  
 Thus reliance of economic growth by giving more weight to short term growth 
strategies is to promote a half baked development recipe which is bound to fail.  
Most governments have focussed on macro-economic gains. That is why policy 
advice post Washington Consensus on structural adjustment had a blind following 
by most developing countries, without asking whether good macro-economics is a 
sufficient condition for good development. Globalisation accused if increasing 
poverty as well as inequality in many countries, due to numerous cases of growth 
collapse. While at the same time, many suggest that the developing countries have 
not done enough to avoid disaster.  Under the dynamic Hecksher-Ohlin model 
discussed in chapter 3, it may be that developing countries can not do enough 
under the biased competition environment prevailing in international markets due 
to certain protectionary policies of developed nations which is much evident by the 
political economy of the WTO (World Trade Organisation. (Stiglitz, 2006) Good 
economic policy advice has to accommodate indigenous limitation of each 
country. Currently international initiatives like WTO are becoming a symbol of 
protection than promoter of equal competition opportunities and the bias is seen in 
favour of the developed countries partly because the negative fall out of 
globalisation has been felt even in developed countries as most rich and middle-
income countries are experiencing rising economic inequality generated by skill-
biased technological change, international trade and other factors related to 
globalisation (Smeeding, 2002). 
For India and China, it is equal distribution of economic gains which has 
become more relevant in recent times, while in Latin American countries like 
Argentina and Brazil, growth and distribution go hand in hand. So what are the 
key characteristics which matter equally good to income generation and re-
distribution of income?  
In developing countries, income inequalities can be affected in two ways. (1) 
Adopt policies which have a redistributive outcome by shifting gains from rich to 
the poor. (2) Or raise the share of income in sectors which mostly employ the 
poorer segments of the society. Both institutions and trade may have a strong 
redistributive power.  For example, democracies, as against, oligarchic societies 
redistribute resources equally to all sections of the society. In a real democratic 
set-up voice of farmers and industry workers are weighed equally and policies are 
structured to raise the share of income for both manufacturing and farm industry. 
Outcomes like increased accountability, preservation of property rights and control 
for corruption may all have redistributive power. Trade can also lead to 
redistribution if developing countries are able to trade more in agriculture produce 
in international markets thus raising the returns to agriculture sector. However, if 
developing countries fail to compete in international markets, governments may 
adopt regulation policies which can protect their labour. The scope of protection of 
agriculture sector in developing countries by means of trade policy measures is 
limited. Nevertheless. However, more exports in agriculture is necessary for 
economic empowerment of the rural population whose livelihoods are directly 
connected with the performance of agriculture sector. Protection of agriculture 
sector is very common in developed countries, while it has been negatively 
affecting the farmers in developing countries. To remedy this problem, developing 
countries can increase trade among each in labor intensive agriculture produce 
causing rise in income share of agriculture in economic growth.  Government 
measures such as subsidies can also be utilised to improve on farm activities. 
Subsidies on pesticides and alike, can improve the produce of agriculture sector 
significantly improving the livelihoods in rural areas So it is a combination of 
good institutions and trade, which eventually leads to inequality mitigation and 
redistribution.   
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To analyse what makes for good economics where not only economic growth is 
achieved but most importantly economic dividends are also distributed equally 
among different strata of the population, this paper conducts a cross-sectional 
analysis of developed and developing countries as a follow-up of Mamoon & 
Murshed (2017). In this paper also, different institutional variables, along with 
different proxies of openness\trade policy are employed while focussing on their 
impact on inequality.  
 
2. Inequality as important as growth  
After the surge of colonialism, the world became a land of unequal 
opportunities. The last century witnessed global inequalities partly lead to regional 
inequalities; and with the return of contemporary globalisation, post-modernism 
brought inequality to the doorstep of each country. Where rural and urban divides 
have been ever increasing so that it recently became of policy importance to 
consider inequality as a significant factor that may stifle growth promoting 
strategies and even reverse what good growth may bring to society. Income 
inequality has become as important as issue as per capita income growth because 
over the last twenty years it is observed that the distributions in poor, middle 
income and rich countries have grown more unequal. 
To account for inequality trends recently observed in developing countries, one 
may start with observations of high levels of inequalities in most countries of Latin 
America. For example, due in part to the recession in the 1980s, which hit the poor 
harder than the rich, inequality in most Latin American countries, except three 
(Colombia, Uruguay and Costa Rica), witnessed sharp rises. Gini coefficients in 
Latin America ranged between 0.45 and 0.60 since the early 1950s, which are 
among the highest in the world. The severe polarisation of income has been due to 
highly unequal distribution of land and educational opportunities (Cornia et al. 
2004). These prevalent inequalities are still stifling the economic potential of the 
region while institutions remain underdeveloped.  
In China, income concentration has been rising rapidly since 1985 so that the 
Gini coefficient reached 0.43 by 1995 and remained more or less at the same level 
until recently. The widening of the urban-rural divide from faster expansion of 
urban activities amid China’s active participation in international markets is 
responsible for the rise in income disparity. Among South-East Asian economies, 
the Gini coefficient for Indonesia increased to 0.38 by 1997 from 0.32 in 1987-90. 
In South Asia, inequality also followed a U-shape pattern, although less 
pronounced. In India, the experience of the 1990s points to a moderate rise in both 
urban and rural inequality and a larger rise in overall inequality due to a widening 
gap between urban and rural areas. In the 1990s, urban inequality rose to 0.36. The 
Gini coefficient in Pakistan rose from 0.39 in the 1960s to 0.41 in the 1990s. Much 
like India, the sharp rise in rural inequalities resulted in the rise in overall 
inequality. Inequality in sub-Saharan Africa has been among the highest in the 
world. There is some evidence of a falling urban-rural gap but there is rising intra-
urban and at times intra-rural inequalities. For example in Tanzania, the Gini 
coefficient for rural inequality rose from 0.53 in the early 1980s to 0.76 in the 
early 1990s. Similarly for Kenya, the rural inequalities increased by nine points 
from 1980 to 1992 and stands at 0.49 (Cornia et al. 2004). 
Rise in inequality is not only a developing country phenomemon: ‘Canada 
excepted, all the countries of English settlement, led by the United States, have 
experienced big increases in income inequality over the past 20-30 years. In the 
United States, the top 1% of the families enjoyed a growth of after-tax income of 
almost 160 % over 1979-97, while families in the middle of the distribution had a 
10% increase. Within the top 1% most of the gains have been concentrated in the 
top 0.1%. This is not a matter of reward to education. Inequality has expanded 
hugely among the college-educated. Whatever the causes, the fact is that the 
United States is now back to the same level of inequality of income as in the 
decades before1929, the era of the ‚robber barons‛ and the Great Gatsby. Income 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 5(2), D. Mamoon, p.160-193. 
166 
166 
distribution in the United Kingdom grew more unequal more quikly than even in 
the United States during the 1980s, and is now the most unequal of the big 
European countries’ (Wade, 2004; 12).  
 
3. Different types of institutions, integration, inequality and 
the endogeneity factors 
There are different measures of inequality which may determine within country 
inequality and they have been widely discussed in recent literature. (See for 
example Wade, 2004; Milanovic, 2006). Most studies concentrate on the positive 
or negative effects of globalisation or integration on income distribution while 
employing diverse proxies of income distribution. Not many studies concentrate 
on the effects of institutions on inequality. There is a need to simultaneously 
model the effects of institutions and integration on income distribution. However, 
before any such analysis is carried out potential endogenieties between integration 
and institutions needs to be addressed, so that a statistically valid model is 
estimated. This section captures the inter connection between institutions, 




Figure 1. Endogeneity between institutions, integration and inequality 
 
There are issues of two-way causality between inequality and institutions (see 
Keefer & Knack 2002; Chong & Gradstein 2004), and between different types of 
institutions as shown by Figure 1 and discussed below. Many recent studies (see 
Chen & Ravallion 2003; Cockburn 2001; Friedman 2000; Lofgren 1999), show 
that international trade relates significantly to inequality while institutions and 
integration are also endogenous. (Rodrik et al., 2004) Any empirical analysis that 
takes institutions as a purely exogenous factor while analysing its effects on 
inequality may lead to mis-specification bias. Here one can conveniently assume 
that geography is a purely endogenous concept which may determine the 
distribution of income as effectively as it explains differences in per capita income 
growth rates.  
Easterly (2001) and Keefer & Knack (2002) suggest that social polarisation 
negatively affects institutional quality. For example, rising inequalities may lead to 
political instability and even civil unrest. Chong & Gradstein (2004) find strong 
evidence of bidirectional causality between institutions and inequality. Inequality 
may affect the quality of institutions. For example high inequality will prevent the 
poor from investing in education or the ruling class may not invest in education so 
that the poor majority will not be politically active, thus undermining the 
development of necessary social and political institutions: ‘High inequality can 
impede the economic performance of a country by obstructing the formation of 
governance structures that enhance productivity. Where this is the case, inequality 
is likely to be the result of a distribution of property rights that is inefficient as 
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well as inequitable. If so, there may be a plausible set of alternative distributions 
that are both more equitable and more efficient; i.e., which foster competition on 
the basis of a more level playing field.’ (Roy & Weeks 2003: 3)  
Brink (2008) also emphasised on addressing inequalities in a society to enable 
the institutions work better: ‘ Even the best institutions require (some more than 
others, depending not so much on their quality as on their design) a personal 
investment on the part of the claimant, sufficient to overcome the resistance of the 
respondent. Some basic capability on the part of the claimant is a precondition for 
the effective exercise of rights. Secondly, institutions are the result of political 
struggles that also require the investment of substantial personal resources, 
sufficient to overcome the resistance of those who can anticipate their 
consequences and would be adversely affected by them. Both the development and 
the operation of institutions respond to the core inequalities present in society. 
Until those inequalities are addressed, it is unlikely that a full democratic rule of 
law will take hold’ (p23). 
The countries with poor institutions are also likely to have high inequality. For 
example in Russia in the 1990s, a small group of entrepreneurs were successful in 
exploiting their political clout to promote their own interests, subverting the 
emergence of institutions committed to the protection of smaller shareholders and 
businesses. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index published by 
Transparency International, among the transition economies, Estonia is 28 and 
Hungary 31; whereas Russia is 79 and Ukraine 83. In these transition economies, 
poor performance of public institutions, absence of effective implementation on 
property rights, and presence of business regulation which favour of influential 
parties, absence of trust in the courts to resolve business disputes, tax evasion and 
higher levels of rent seeking have strong correlation with high inequality in the 
society. (Hellman & Kaufman, 2002) Similarly, in several Latin American 
countries, the ruling elites, the military and large businesses impeded smaller 
business interests giving rise to significant informal sector. Chong & Gradstein 
(2004), show that when the political bias in favour of the rich is large, income 
inequality and poor institutional quality may reinforce each other, indicating 
endogeneity between the two. 
There may also be inter-linkages between various institutions. For example, 
nearly all developed countries are democracies and most developing countries are 
one-party systems, dictatorships or military regimes. The countries with lower 
levels of economic and human development tend to have lower levels of 
education, limited political rights, weak or non-existent political competition, 
lower level of economic freedom and openness, ethno-linguistic factionalism, lack 
of judicial independence and a free press, and high levels of permissiveness 
towards corruption. 
 
 Table 1. Different Kinds of Institutions 
Institutions What they Capture 
Political Institutions: Political stability, democracy, the separation of powers  
Legal Institutions: Laws and their enforcements 
Economic Institutions: Promotion of private wealth 
Social Institutions: Human motivations and social structure. 
 
Before discussing in detail the interdependence of different institutions, it is 
important first to differentiate between them. There are four types of institutions 
identified: legal, political, economic and social (Williamson, 1999). A hierarchy of 
institutions are presented in Table 1. Social institutions capture socioeconomic 
conditions such as health, education and nutrition and can be analogous to human 
capital which has basis in its historic evolution. For example the reference of 
Glaeser et al. (2004a) towards the endogeniety between AJR settler mortality with 
settlers’ human capital is one indication of long run transformation of social 
institution in developing countries. Legal institutions capture the transparency and 
fairness of the legal system, preservation of political rights of the citizens, state 
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legitimacy, freedom of speech, independence of judiciary, enforceability of 
contracts, police effectiveness, access to independent and impartial courts, 
confidence in judicial system in insuring property rights, prevention of improper 
practices in public sphere, control of corruption and so on. Political institutions 
represent political stability, democracy, autocracy or dictatorship or rules which 
promote political process, civil liberties and political rights. Economic institutions 
comprise state effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government 
revenue. As well as, the ability to create, deliver and maintain vital national 
infrastructure, the ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems; 
independence of government economic policies from pressure of special interest 
groups, trade and foreign exchange; competition policy, privatisation, banking 
reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities and non-bank financial 
institutions. 
The legal, political, economic and social institutions are strong in developed 
countries while developing countries have mixed experiences. For example, the 
US and most advanced societies vigorously protect intellectual property rights, but 
this is not the case in many developing countries. (Rodrik, 1999) Engerman & 
Sokoloff (2002) link the development of public education, as a social institution, to 
democratisation as a political process in the US. They argue that while starting at a 
similar level of development in the 18th century, the US led the way in setting up a 
system of common schools and promoting literacy, whereas countries in South 
America and the Caribbean delayed implementing these processes. Gupta et al. 
(1998) find that if government officials use their authority for private gain and 
indulge in corruption, it affects the effectiveness of social spending and the 
formation of human capital by perpetuating an unequal distribution of asset 
ownership and unequal access to education. Corruption also affects government 
effectiveness as it weakens tax administration and can lead to tax evasion and 
improper tax exemptions. Higher corruption is associated with increased 
inequalities in education, land distribution and health spending. Wealthy urban 
elites can lobby the government for biased social expenditure towards higher 
education and tertiary health, which tends to benefit high-income groups (Gupta et 
al. 1998). 
Furthermore, trade opening in societies with weak institutions may lead to 
worse economic policies (Segura-Cayuela, 2005). For example, those transition 
economies that implemented trade reforms slowly and where government 
institutions were able to perform well with time, smaller increases in inequality 
and smaller output decline occurred. However, the transition economies with weak 
government structures performed as ‘passive globalisers’ and the trade-to-GDP 
ratios in them were quite high, partly accounting for capital flight, while poverty 
and inequality increased (Yudaeva, 2002). 
Inequalities may lead to political upheavals against globalisation and 
integration. Some developing countries may trade with developed countries 
because of common polity, whereas some countries cannot effectively trade 
because there lays ideological differences between governance structures. For 
example, despite Iran being an Oil rich country, do not trade with United States or 
Israel on ideological grounds while it may establish stronger trade relations with 
the competitors of United States e.g. Russia and Venezuela. Conflict and political 
instability also cause countries to trade less effectively with rest of the world 
causing negative externalities in terms of increased costs of trade. For-example 
Pakistan and India, despite being neighbours, have a history of conflict, and they 
do not trade with each other more, despite high costs incurred in terms of 
competitions and economic rivalry. India is traditionally a democracy, while 
Pakistan has scored usually low in democracy. Thus there is a strong correlation 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variables Code Source Obs Std. Dev 
Dependent     
GINI Coefficient in Percentage Points as calculated by 
WIDER, 1995 
Gini UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) [Retrieved from].  117 (35.00) 
UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure, 1999 Theil99 University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) [Retrieved from].  155 (0.099) 
Lowest income decile,  1995 
 
Low10 UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) [Retrieved from]. 117 (1.05) 
Fifth income percentile/ First income percentile, 1995 High20/ 
Low20 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) [Retrieved from]. 
 
117 (2.28) 
Third income percentile, 1995 Thrd20 UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) [Retrieved from]. 117 (2.22) 
Highest income decile, 1995 High10 UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) [Retrieved from]. 117 (7.50) 
Endogenous Independent     
Openness Variables     
(Exports +Imports)/GDP at current dollar prices, 1985 Lcopen World Development Indicators 170 (0.589) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1985 Impnov85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (21.08) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1982 Impnov82 Pritchett (1996) 95 (23.85) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1985 Tars85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (36.91) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1982 Tars82 Pritchett (1996) 93 (83.10) 
Trade Policy Variables     
Import duties as % imports,1985 Tariffs World Development Indicators 99 (8.903) 
Tariffs on international inputs and capital goods, 1985 Owti Sachs & Warner (1995) 98 (0.165 
Trade taxes/ trade, 1982 Txtrdg Pritchett (1996) 54 (0.031) 
Weighted average of total import charges, 1985 Totimpov85 Pritchett (1996) 
(Available for developing countries only) 
76 (21.30) 
Non trade barriers frequency on intermediate inputs, 
1985 
Owqi Sachs & Warner (1995) 96 (0.24) 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: overall, 1987 Nontarr87 Pritchett (1996) (Available for developing countries only) 76 (36.305) 
Sachs and Warner’s composite openness index, 1980 Open80s Edwards (1998) 61 (0.446) 
Institutions     
Political     
Voice and Accountability, 1999 Range: 2.5 to -2.5 Va Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2003) 170 (0.952) 
Political stability, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Ps Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2003) 156 (0.954) 
Democracy, 2000 
Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high), Democracy Score: 
general openness of political institutions. The 11-point 
Democracy scale is constructed additively 
Demo Polity IV dataset) 123 (4.33) 
Autocracy 
Range = 0 to -10 (0 = low; -10 = high), general 
closeness of political institutions. The 11-point 
autocracy scale is constructed additively 
Auto Polity IV dataset) 123 (3.69) 
Legal     
Rule of Law, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Rl Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2003) 166 (0.937) 
Control for Corruption, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Ctc Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2003) 159 (0.910) 
Economic     
Government effectiveness, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Ge Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2003) 157 (0.893) 
Regulatory quality, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Rq Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2003) 166 (0.892) 
Social     
Average years of Schooling, 1999 Sch99 Baro & Lee (2001) 109 (2.914) 
Instruments     
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed 
from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ 
variables, 
Lfrkrom Frankel & Romer (1999) 163 (16.75) 
Fraction of the population speaking English Engfrac Hall & Jones (1999) 182 (0.236) 
Fraction of the population speaking one of the major 
languages of Western Europe: French, German, 
Portugese or Spanish 
Eurfrac Hall & Jones (1999) 185 (0.380) 
Drop out rate, 1990s Drop90 Barro & Lee (1999) 125 (0.802) 
Number of school days Schday Barro &d Lee (1999) 139 (23.43) 
Distance from the equator of capital city measured as 
abs (Latitude)/90 
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4. Data and methodology  
The six governance indicators utilised in Mamoon & Murshed (2017) are the 
same employed here for the analysis. They are categorised as rule of law (Rl), 
political stability (Ps), regulatory quality (Rq), government effectiveness (Ge), 
voice and accountability (Va) and control of corruption (Ctc). This chapter divides 
them into four classifications based on their definitions considering Rl, and Ctc as 
legal institutions. Ge and Rq are economic institutions whereas Va and Ps is a 
proxy for Political institutions. This analysis adds two more political indicators 
namely, democracy (Demo) and autocracy (Auto) to the analysis from Polity 
dataset whereas, both range from 0 to 10. The analysis also includes average 
schooling years in the total population at 25 (Sch)) in order to capture the quality 
of social institutions.  
As mentioned above, international trade is also a significant determinant of 
inequalities in countries across the globe; integration enters the regression model 
to enhance its explanatory power, while we can also test whether globalisation is a 
cause to rising inequalities. This paper incorporates not one but eight various 
concepts of integration based on outcome as well as incidence based measures of 
trade barriers. The ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is the 
conventional openness indicator. Two other measures of openness are overall trade 
penetration (tarshov) derived from the World Bank’s TARS system and overall 
import penetration (Impnov) respectively. Import tariffs as percentage of imports 
(Tariffs), tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owti), trade taxes as a 
ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) and total import charges (Totimpov) can all be 
considered as good proxies for trade restrictiveness and have also been employed 
in this study. Other measures that capture restrictions in overall trade are non-tariff 
barriers. Overall non-tariff coverage (Ntarfov) and non-tariff barriers on 
intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owqi) are used here as two proxies for non-
tariff barriers. Sachs & Warner’s (1995) openness index (Open80) is utilised as a 
composite measure of trade policy. 
First, comparable and consistent measures of income inequality, whether on a 
household level or per head basis are difficult, almost implausible and generally 
fail to provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-country coverage.  For 
example, between-country world PPP income inequality using per capita GDPs, 
equal country weights (China=Uganda), through a GINI estimate has been found 
to have increased since 1980s.  However between country world PPP income 
inequality with countries weighted by population has been found to be constant or 
falling since around 1980s (see Wade, 2004).  For this, recent literature on income 
inequality prefers global income inequality indicator over country specific ones 
(see Milanovic, 2006). However we are more interested in country specific effects 
of inequality to differentiate between developed and developing countries. To 
capture income inequality this chapter employs GINI income inequality index 
(Gini) for both developed and developing countries from UNU/WIDER World 
Income Inequality Database (WIID).  
However, there are many issues revolving around the calculation of GINI index 
which have also been presented in some detail in WIDER User Guide (2008): 
‘There are no easy ways to use income/consumption distribution data. Unlike 
national accounts data which are in principle comparable across countries, there is 
no agreed basis of definition for the construction of distribution data. Sources and 
methods might vary, especially across but within countries. This may be the case 
even if the data comes from the same source. In their influential article on the use 
of secondary data in studies on income distribution, Atkinnson & Brandolini 
(2001) discuss quality and consistency in income distribution data both within and 
across countries. They show how both levels and trends in distributional data can 
be affected by data choices. In light of this, it is not easy task to construct a 
secondary database with distribution data. Regardless of different views, the 
collection of inequality observations is restricted to what in practice is available. In 
most industrialised countries inequality and poverty are assessed with reference to 
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income, not consumption (Deaton & Zaid, 2002). This tradition is followed in 
much of Latin America. By contrast, most Asian and African surveys have always 
collected detailed consumption data. The fact that distribution data can be based on 
both income and consumption is the first step stone in the construction of 
comparable statistics. In WIID (reference to WIDER data base) we strived to 
collect observations with reference to both income and consumption, whenever 
possible’ (p.4). 
These are introductory lines of the user manual which have quite nicely 
summarised the problem faced with the collection of comparable data to construct 
within country GINI index across a set of countries.  To address this critique of 
data problem faced with the measures of income distribution, this chapter has also 
employed other concepts of inequality. UTIP-UNIDO Theil measure (Theil) 
calculated by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) captures wage 
inequality between skilled and unskilled labour in manufacturing pay sector and 
available for both developed and developing countries. Several factors motivate 
this decision. On the data methodological front manufacturing pay, based on 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more stable, 
more reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO measures are 
based on a two or three digit code of International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), a single systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, for 
nearly 40 years most countries around the world have measured manufacturing pay 
with reasonable accuracy as a matter of official routine. (Galbraith & Kum 2002). 
However, literature also relates rise in wage inequality with the behaviour of 
relative factor supplies (see Acemoglu, 2003).   
The same study, nevertheless, indicates that changes in relative demand may 
also cause changes in relative sill premia, through at least four distinct effects: 
1. Own technology development by different countries with different degrees of 
skill bias. 
2. Lack of technical capabilities in some countries to adapt to most recent skilled-
bias technologies. 
3. Efficiency in adoption of more skilled biased technologies from a global 
technology frontier.  
4. Different trading regimes with different levels of trade opening affecting the 
demand of skills differentially.  
Different degrees of skill bias, or a countries potential to adapt to most recent 
skilled bias technologies or its efficiency in choosing skilled bias technologies 
from global technology frontier may all be determined by prevalent institutions. 
For-example, efficient economic and political institutions would enable the 
countries to adopt or benefit from skill biased technologies thus raising the 
demand for skills. This can all be done to achieve better growth rates. For-
example, countries like India and China, where a significant population has been 
educated and skilled in urban clusters, a skilled bias technical progress is 
underway. This factor has resulted in outsourcing of jobs from the developed 
countries to India and china’s business capitals. The skill premia has significantly 
gone up, while the relative price of low skilled has fallen down. For-example 
within the manufacturing sector, low skilled wage usually rise at a far less 
proportion than skilled labor wage. In most cases, the low skill wage is stagnant 
because of excess supply of low skilled. The excess supply is sustained by 
continuously increasing trends of migration from rural to urban.  
Some studies argue that international trade play a limited role in the increase in 
the relative demand for skills (see i.e., Acemoglu 2002). However, such works 
focus more on wage patterns in developed countries and the evidence of trade in 
determining skill premia for developed countries is limited since they are leaders 
in technology whereas technology leaders may not generally import new 
technologies from other countries and thus technical change for all such 
technology leaders is an indigenous process. The skill biased technical diffusion 
effect through trade in developed countries is only possible when they trade among 
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each other. However, for the larger world, which mostly comprises of developing 
countries, trade is one of the significant sources of technical change especially in 
the presence of lax intellectual property rights. Acemoglu (2002) suggest that most 
developing countries are in any case unprepared to utilise most of the technologies 
adopted by developed countries and thus the scope of technical change through 
trading with developed countries remain very limited. Here the case of China and 
India may refute this hypothesis as they have been able to adopt and transfer 
relatively sophisticated technologies. In recent times, more and more Indian and 
Chinese enterprises are appearing in the list fortune 500 companies. Further 
opening up of India and China to world markets post 1990 has brought significant 
technical change in both countries which must have a significant relationship with 
a rise in skill premia. Currently many Indian multinationals are incorporating new 
technologies for indigenous use.  For example, TATA has been offering to build 
the cheapest car in the world, the production of which has only been delayed 
because of relocation of production plant to another location due to a dispute over 
procured land for the plant in State of Bengal. However, one should also note here 
that early grounds were prepared in India and China in 1970s and 1980s by 
practicing high protection of industrial sector to catch up to new technologies 
which are increasingly practiced today in businesses. With skill bias technical 
change, both countries have witnesses rise in skill premia as India and China are 
emerging as technology leaders among other less developed countries in Asia.  
Acemoglu (2002) scepticism over trade than technical change affecting skill 
premia is more of an empirical contention and especially for the case of U.S. In 
another paper though, Acemoglu (1999), already introduce a dynamic model to 
discuss the possibility of rise in skill premia for both developed and developing 
countries due to trade between each other which would bring additional 
technological diffusion effect to developing countries and skill-biased technical 
change in developed countries. The paper explains its motivation in favour of rise 
in relative wage inequality among skilled and unskilled, due to trade between 
developed and developing countries, by incorporating technical change as the 
dynamic externality: ‘increased international trade will have an effect on skill 
premia by changing the nature of technologies that are being developed, as well as 
its more direct standard effect. Under most plausible circumstances, trade between 
U.S and the LDCs (Least Developed Countries) will induce skill-biased technical 
change in the U.S., and will cause a large increase in U.S. skill premia. Contra to 
the standard models, this induced technology effect also implies that trade may 
increase skill premia in the LDCs’ (p.26). 
Similarly, by drawing comparison of globalisation with soccer, Milanovic 
(2003b) comes up with an interesting analogy which can partly explain the skill 
bias in high growth oriented manufacturing sector activities across the globe and 
its unequal outcomes within countries. As in soccer today where the quality of the 
game has arisen with the rise in players’ skills with matching salaries and where 
best players are paired to only play with those who are also among the best; to 
compete in global markets, countries have to raise the share of skills (good jobs) in 
their population to match the skills (good jobs) in the developed countries because 
skilled intensive production activities may only take place where appropriate skills 
are present and these activities in addition to directly benefiting these skills with a 
high premium, also benefit the country through technology spill over effects which 
improves the growth potential of the country. India and China have successfully 
transformed a significant portion of population which can match the rising global 
skill demand (good jobs) and thus these skilled labor are directly benefiting from 
globalisation. The solution can vary. In the short run, one solution is to protect low 
wage labor through regulations such that high wage (good) jobs and low-wage 
(bad) jobs can co-exist (Acemoglu, 2001a). 
As contended by Acemoglu (2002), United States and United Kingdom, who 
are leaders in technology among other developed nations, have been witnessing a 
rise in skill premia which in contrast to India and China may not have lot to do 
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with international trade. However, the downward pressure on the relative wages of 
lower skilled is partly attributed to job outsourcing to developing countries by 
many business enterprises located in these Western technology leaders, most of 
whom have found many urban commerce havens in South Asia and East Asia 
where skilled labour, only relative to local market standards, is employed in 
outsourced job market. However, one may note that without efficient technology 
transfer by developed countries to (or adoption by) the developing ones and by 
already creating skills among strata of urban population through investment in 
education, outsourcing business would not have been a cost efficient one. And in 
the first place, to make technology transfer and adoption possible, trade between 
developed and developing countries have been a pre-requisite. Thus technical bias 
change and trade go hand in hand for both developed and developing countries to 
determine skill premium as is rightly modelled by Acemoglu (1999).   
Trade and Globalisation, may also lead to rise in wage inequality because many 
developing countries pay protection premium to skilled labor in order to pursue a 
local path to technological development. While availability of cheap and relatively 
unskilled labor in global technical frontier may cause a downward pressure on 
wages of unskilled relative to skilled in developed countries as developed 
countries try to retain their niche in technology and more and more economic 
activity require higher skills which would then always follow excess demand of 
more refined skills in the context of local and global factor supply market.   Thus 
production technologies would always move places relative to their skill intensity 
globally and locally to find cost effective supply of labour which best matches 
their skill requirement. While international trade would provide the basic frame 
work for the very possibility of relocation of these these production technologies. 
In a technology driven world the returns to relative skills would always be high 
irrespective of production location.  
The possibility to find a negative relationship between wage inequality and 
trade for developing countries would come about if trade between them increase, 
especially among countries which are at similar technical frontier but their access 
to technology is unequal: some are ready to adopt more skill biased technologies 
than the others. A detailed discussion of this scenario has already been presented, 
discussing the trading opportunities and its skill bias fallout in presence of 
economic cooperation between say China and Thailand. Further more, by 
increasing the mean level of education; developing countries can offset the 
negative effects of trade on labor markets (Mamoon & Murshed, 2008).  
And as discussed before, in addition to the trade side, institutional side also 
play an important role. Like income inequality, there may also be a strong 
connection between good institutions and smooth labour markets. Thus such 
questions are also important: Are more educated societies with better legal, 
political and economic institutions more capable to absorb the upward pressure 
which is put by technical bias on relative factor returns? Does the presence of good 
institutions form grounds for technical change with overall fewer distortions in 
labor market returns? If yes then good institutions would be expected to put a 
down ward pressure on wage inequality.   
 To take a step further from empirical literature on inequality which focus on 
GINI and to make the analysis more intensive empirically for the robustness of the 
results, this chapter also employs income deciles and percentiles derived from 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) as other proxies of 
inequality. Institutions or integration will be guilty of inequality if it has a negative 
impact on the incomes of the bottom 10 per cent (low10) and positive impact on 
the income of the top 10 per cent (high 10). Income groups are also divided into 
quintiles anticipating the effect of institutions to be negative for the ratio between 
the top 20 per cent and bottom 20 per cent (high20/low20) and positive for the 
middle-income groups (Middle20) are included. The exercise on income deciles 
and percentiles will shed light on how institutions and integration relate to income 
distribution. Of special interest is how quality of institutions relates to the incomes 
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of the middle-class or the ones living in the bottom income share. Each country 
observation for all inequality measures come from the last year for which data is 
available and in most cases represent inequality in the mid-1990s. Our basic 
inequality and income share equations would look like: 
 
Inequality = f (Institutions, Integration, Geography)                (1) 
Income Share= f (Institutions, Integration, Geography)                (2) 
 
Corresponding to Eq. (1), the inequality model based on Theil index has eight 
equations whereas each equation corresponds to a different institutional or 
integration classification. The model specifications for Gini, High20/Low20, 
Middle20, Low10 and High10 contain the same eight equations each with the 
same variable specifications.  
 
iiii GeoOpenLITheil 11111                   (3) 
iiii GeoOpenPITheil 22222                  (4) 
iiii GeoOpenEITheil 33333                   (5) 
iiii GeoOpenSITheil 44444                   (6) 
iiii GeoTPLITheil 55555                   (7) 
iiii GeoTPPITheil 66666                   (8) 
iiii GeoTPEITheil 77777                   (9) 
iiii GeoTPSITheil 88888                             (10) 
 
The variable iTheil  is Theil index in a country i, iLI , iPI , iEI , and iSI are 
respectively measures for legal, political, economic and social institutions, 
whereas iOpen measures general openness in the economy and iTP  is a measure 
for trade policy and i  is the random error term. Equations based on Gini, 
High20/Low20, Middle20, Low20 and High10 have similar specifications. 
As discussed, there are potential endogeneity problems between institutions and 
integration and between institutions and inequality itself. Therefore the 
institutional, trade policy and openness proxies presented here were first regressed 
on a set of instruments. This chapter takes the same set of instruments which were 
used in chapter 2 to instrument for openness/ trade policy, institutions and human 
capital which is considered as a social institution in this analysis. Frankel & Romer 
(1999) (FR) makes up for the instrument for all the outcome and incidence 
measures of trade barriers utilised in this chapter. FR instrument uses trade/GDP 
shares constructed based on a gravity equation for bilateral trade flows. Following, 
Hall & Jones (1999), the extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe 
are the first languages are taken as instruments for Legal, Political and Economic 
institutions. Hall and Jones argue that the instruments do not correlate with the 
error term. Though, it is good to briefly mention again that Acemolgu, Johnson & 
Robinson (2001) (AJR) identify the mortality of European settlers as a potential 
instrument. Using two ex post assessments of institutional quality -risk of 
expropriation by the government and constraints on the executive- as measures of 
institutions, they showed that settler mortality is a strong predictor of institutions. 
However, there are two drawbacks for the AJR instrument as mentioned in 
Mamoon & Murshed (2017). According to Glaeser et al. (2004a), AJR instrument 
of settler mortality fails to be orthogonal to the error term. ‘Settler mortality is 
strongly correlated not just with ancient, but also with the modern, decease 
environment, suggesting that it might be the decease environment, rather than 
history, that matters for economic development. Secondly, settler mortality is 
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strongly correlated with human capital accumulation, suggesting that it cannot be 
used as an instrument for institutions.’ (Glasear et al. 2004a: 8) Also the data for 
AJR instrument is only available for 64 countries. Although Rodrik et al. (2004) 
extended it to 80 countries; it still covers a relatively low number when compared 
to ‘the extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe are spoken as 
first languages today,’ which covers as many as 140 countries.   
Since years of schooling for proxy for social institutions, dropout rates (drop90) 
and school days in a year (Schday) are employed as instruments.  As in Rodrik et 
al. (2004) and Hall & Jones (1999), ‘distance from the equator’, here is another 
instrument (proxy for geography) also employed by Hall & Jones (1999). The IV 
analysis in chapter 2 has already established the statistical validity of these 
instruments. However, here the instruments enter first stage of the analysis under 
slightly different specifications. For Legal, Political and Economic institutions, the 
regression models corresponds to specification in Mamoon & Murshed (2017) 
when human capital was absent. In this paper, Sch99 and Alter corresponds to 
Social institutions and thus a new specification has been introduced where Social 
institutions would enter different inequality equations with a combination of 
different outcome based (openness, Open) or incidence based (trade policy, TP) 
respectively. Following is the model specifications for first stage regressions based 
on instruments:  
 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngLI 111111                          (11) 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngPI 222222               (12) 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngEI 333333               (13) 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngOpen 4444441               (14) 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngTP 5555551               (15) 
iiiii DisteqFRSchdayDropSI 666666 90              (16) 
iiiii DisteqFRSchdayDropOpen 7777772 90                (17) 
iiiii DisteqFRSchdayDropTP 8888882 90              (18) 
 
Where iEng  and iEur  are the instruments for legal, economic and political 
institutions referring to fractions of population speaking English and European 
languages respectively. Drop90 is Annua Drop out rates and Schday is number of 
schooling days. Both are instruments for average years of schooling and adult 
literacy rate. iFR  an instrument for openness and trade policy. iDisteq  a proxy 
for geography showing distance from the equator. At the second stage, the income 
share equations employ the predicted values of respective institutional, openness 
and trade policy variables.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. 1st Stage results 
The first stage results are presented in table 3. All instruments seem to work 
quite well for the outcome based (openness) measures of trade barriers and high R-
square and F-statistic show that instruments significantly explain the variation in 
trade shares. However for incidence based (trade policy) measures of trade 
barriers, F-statistics have declined and range between 7 and 5. For tariffs on 
international inputs and capital goods (Owti), weighted average for total import 
charges (Totimpov85), Non-tariff barrier coverage (Nontarr87) and Sachs and 
Warners composite openness index (Open80), the FR instrument is significant. FR 
trade shares are weekly related with import duties (Tariffs) and trade taxes 
(Txtrdg). For NTBs, instruments are insignificant in all cases, while F-statistics is 
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mere 0.73. Instruments work quite well for Legal, Political, Economic and Social 
institutions with F-statistic much higher than 10, and high R2, while all 
instruments are significantly related with all institutional regressors. Low F-
statistics for incidence based measures may indicate that instruments employed are 
weakly related with the regressors.  
Discussion on relevance and validity of instruments has already been carried 
out in chapter 2 and suggests that low F-statistics may not necessary confers to 
weakness of instruments. Staiger & Stock (1997) rule of thumb of F-test to be 
equal to or greater than 10 for the good fit of instruments may only hold in case of 
one instrument and one regressor. When the number of instruments are moderate 
or large, higher order asymptotic tests, which are already proposed in Mamoon & 
Murshed (2017), needs to be carried out.  Higher order asymptotic tests include (1) 
obtaining Craag & Donald (1993) critical values to reject 2SLS bias and (2) 
Anderson-Rubin test of joint significance of endogenous regressors for relevance 
of instruments; (3) Hansen or Sargan over identification test statistics for 
erogeneity; and (4) Baum, Schaffer and Still’s recommended test for 
heteroskedasticity robust 1st stage estimate for reducing omitted variable bias. To 
carry out all these tests, the author refers to IV stage analysis where these higher 
order asymptotic testing is done and made it available for many of the 2SLS 
specifications which are run under Eq. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. In all these 
specification different definitions of inequality are utilised along with different 
specifications of Legal, Political, Economic, Social institutions and integration as 
regressors. 
 
Table. 3. First Stage Regression 




















































             
Lfrkrom 0.533 11.616 19.811 29.88 46.47 -1.02 -0.078 0.0048 0.3739 -0.036 -18.08 0.195 
 (11.5)*** (7.9)*** (7.2)*** (7.4)*** (4.0)*** (-0.8) (-3.4)*** (0.98) (3.0)*** (-0.9) (-3.0)*** (2.9)*** 
Engfrac 0.407 19.71 20.609 29.78 115.99 -1.49 -0.01 0.001 -0.113 -0.105 4.254 -0.018 
 (2.1)** (2.4)*** (2.2)** (2.0)** (2.9)*** (-0.3) (-0.1) (0.08) (-0.23) (-0.77) (0.17) (-0.08) 
Eurfrac -0.208 -6.656 -7.67 -5.23 -4.598 -3.56 -0.067 -0.016 0.164 -0.006 -28.107 0.208 
 (-1.9)* (-1.23) (-1.21) (-0.53) (-0.17) (-1.30) (-1.29) (-1.63)* (0.67) (-0.07) (-2.3)*** (1.43) 
Disteq -0.003 -0.015 -0.21 0.052 -0.534 -0.208 -0.002 -0.0007 0.022 -0.001 -0.238 0.010 
 (-1.26) (-0.14) (-1.60) (0.26) (-0.99) (-3.8)*** (-2.1)** (-3.8)*** (2.9)*** (-0.84) (-0.65) (3.6)*** 
             
N 122 82 84 85 82 85 85 52 66 83 83 54 
F 39.00*** 18.54*** 15.98*** 15.56*** 7.12*** 5.47*** 5.36*** 5.09*** 4.57*** 0.73 7.21*** 7.44*** 
R2 0.57 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.38 
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Average years of 
schooling, 1999 
(Sch99) 
Lfrkrom 0.154 0.234 0.229 0.081 0.238 0.254 0.364 0.108 -0.274 
 (2.0)** (2.7)** (2.9)*** (1.31) (3.8)*** (3.3)*** (0.83) (0.28) (-1.01) 
Engfrac 0.621 0.395 0.573 0.324 0.586 0.832 2.623 -0.505  
 (2.0)** (1.09) (1.90)* (1.32) (1.9)* (2.7)*** (1.5) (-0.33)  
Eurfrac 0.698 0.478 0.457 0.572 0.302 0.0326 4.79 -4.73  
 (3.7)*** (2.4** (2.5)** (3.8)*** (1.6)* (1.8)* (4.7)*** (-5.2)***  
Drop90         -0.049 
         (-4.4)*** 
Schday         -0.0092 
         (-0.68) 
Disteq 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.014 0.031 0.030 0.085 -0.051 0.0761 
 (7.8)*** (6.3)*** (7.3)*** (4.8)*** (8.3)*** (8.3)*** (4.8)*** (-2.81)*** (4.8)*** 
          
N 122 116 117 122 122 118 108 108 85 
F 27.1*** 40.4*** 22.2*** 14.4*** 24.9*** 26.6*** 16.4*** 12.7*** 22.1*** 
R2 0.48 0.59 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.49 0.38 0.33 0.52 
Notes: t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels 
respectively 
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5.2. IV Results 
 5.2.1. Relevance and exogeniety of instruments 
This section undertakes relevance and exogeniety tests under higher order 
asymptotic framework for the institutional and integration regressors for GINI, 
Theil, High20/Low20 and Mid20 some selected number of combinations of these 
regressors. Relvance and exogeniety tests are also carried out for Low10 and 
High10, but they are not presented here as the results obtained by former tests 
would already provide enough information to conclude whether instruments have 
worked well.  
Table 4 provide results for Gini Index. Instruments strongly pass the relevance 
test for any of the combinations of institutions and integration except for Owqi. 
Owqi fails relevance test for not only Gini Index, but also for Theil index in table 
5, High20/Low20 in table 4.6 and Mid20 in table 7. This is expected as we already 
know from 1st stage results that all instruments have been insignificant in case of 
Owqi, while the F-statistic was approximating to 0.  
Instruments have been found to be weakly related with Taiffs for Theil99. For 
other dependent variables also like Gini, High20/Low20 and Mid20, the 2SLS bias 
in case of Tariffs is large. This is also in line with 1st stage results, where most 
instruments fail to significantly explain Tariffs with the only exception of Disteq.  
 The 2nd stage regressions have suffered more from the problem of endogeniety, 
especially in case of High20/Low20 and Mid 20  when ever, Legal, Political, 
Economic and Social institutions enter with outcome based (openness) measures 
of trade barriers. This brings us back to the analysis by Rodrik et al. (2004), which 
was run on per capita income differences and problem of endogeniety was present 
in all regressions. High20/Low20 and Mid20 are also estimates of incomes but 
based on percentiles instead of taking incomes of all groups and utilising an 
average: as in case of per capita income which is average income of all 
households. The persistent of the presence of endogeniety in specifications where 
trade shares enter as a regressor indicates the increased possibility that such 
specifications may suffer from omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, no presence of 
2SLS bias which is seen to approximate to 0, in all cases where openness is the 
regressor show that IV analysis is superior to simple OLS.  
In case of trade policy, exogeniety tests are generally passed for all those trade 
policy proxies which have also passed the Cragg-Donald maximal 2SLS bias test 
of relevance. Only in case of Theil99 few trade policy proxies such as Owti, 
Ntarfov and Open80s in addition to Owqi fail over-identification tests.  Though the 
presence of endogeniety between regressors and the error term is not good news 
for the empirical analysis, it has come as a good news for the theoretical validation 
of the very regressions which analyse the role of trade in determining wage 
inequality because it refutes the assertion put forward by Acemoglu (2002) that 
trade is only weekly related with technology bias which creates increase demand 
for skilled labor. Presence of endogeniety suggest that trade policies in both 
developed and developing countries are inter connected with the adoption of skill 
bias technologies  in more ways then what is generally perceived in literature. The 
theoretical discussion carried out in section 4.4 to this effect also validates the 
above finding. Table 4, 5, 6 and 7 shows that for all combinations of regressors 











Journal of Economics and Political Economy 












Table 4.  Multiple tests for the relevance and quality of instruments for Gini index 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
 Endogenous Dependent Variable: 
 GINI Coefficients in Percentage Points as calculated from consumption 





























on test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2) 
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Voice and Accountability ( Lcopen, Va) 97 Robust 0.00 107.83** 4.95*** 0.063 
       (0.969) 
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Political Stability ( Lcopen, Ps) 89 Robust 0.00 65.24** 4.83*** 0.170 
       (0.918) 
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, Ge) 90 Robust 0.00 73.53** 5.03*** 0.146 
       (0.929) 
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 96 Robust 0.00 68.52** 4.97*** 0.019 
       (0.988) 
5 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 96 Robust 0.00 92.08** 4.79*** 0.116 
       (0.943) 
6 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 92 Robust 0.00 69.77** 4.60*** 0.102 
       (0.9505) 
7 Nominal Trade Shares, Democracy (Lcopen, Demo) 90 Robust 0.00 53.05** 5.05*** 0.031 
       (0.984) 
8 Nominal Trade Shares, Autocracy (Lcopen, Auto) 90 Robust 0.00 46.43** 5.05*** 0.016 
       (0.992) 
9 Nominal Trade Shares, Average Years of Schooling (Lcopen, Sch99) 73 Robust 0.00 74.84** 2.39* 1.072 
       (0.585) 
10 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 62.63** 2.49* 0.268 
       (0.874) 
11 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 95.07** 17.74*** 11.532 
       (0.0031)*** 
12 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 52.35** 2.49* 0.162 
       (0.922) 
13 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 68 Robust 0.00 73.80** 16.61*** 10.942 
       (0.004)*** 
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
        
14 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 71 Robust 0.37 3.14** 19.52*** 0.778 
       (0.677) 
15 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 71 Robust 0.078 6.79** 2.62** 2.28 
 (Owti, Rl)      (0.319) 
16 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 46 Robust 0.072 6.99** 18.20*** 0.943 
       (0.624) 
17 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 0.92 0.06 
 (Totimpov85, Rl)      (0.970) 
18 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 70 Robust 0.846 0.81 3.30*** 0.928 
       (0.628) 
19 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 52 Robust 0.042 8.27** 0.92 1.762 
       (0.414) 
20 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 48 Robust 0.00 7.97** 1.92* 3.45 
       (0.178) 
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Table 5. Multiple tests for the relevance and quality of instruments for Theil99 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
 Endogenous Dependent Variable:  


























on test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2) 
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Voice and Accountability ( Lcopen, Va) 122 Robust 0.00 113 3.92*** 1.738 
       (0.419) 
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Political Stability ( Lcopen, Ps) 116 Robust 0.00 72.73 3.23** 1.058 
       (0.589) 
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, Ge) 117 Robust 0.00 91.62 3.38** 1.46 
       (0.48) 
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 122 Robust 0.00 58.87 3.54*** 1.69 
       (0.42) 
5 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 122 Robust 0.00 101.83 3.54*** 1.72 
       (0.42) 
6 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 118 Robust 0.00 107.42 3.30** 1.76 
       (0.41) 
7 Nominal Trade Shares, Democracy (Lcopen, Demo) 108 Robust 0.00 68.23** 3.86*** 1.877 
       (0.391) 
8 Nominal Trade Shares, Autocracy (Lcopen, Auto) 108 Robust 0.00 47.94** 3.86*** 1.393 
       (0.498) 
9 Nominal Trade Shares, Average Years of Schooling (Lcopen, Sch99) 108 Robust 0.00 85.17** 6.85*** 2.647 
       (0.266) 
10 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 85 Robust 0.00 75.48 5.28*** 1.094 
       (0.578) 
11 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 84 Robust 0.00 60.64 4.87*** 0.981 
       (0.612) 
12 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 85 Robust 0.00 66.09 5.28*** 1.339 
       (0.511) 
13 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 82 Robust 0.00 28.20 5.08*** 0.329 
        
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
        
14 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 85 Robust 0.71 1.37 6.46*** 6.289 
       (0.04)** 
15 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 85 Robust 0.06 7.41 4.86*** 5.596 
 (Owti, Rl)      (0.06)* 
16 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 52 Robust 0.08 6.74 3.47*** 4.23 
       (0.12) 
17 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 66 Robust 0.02 9.52 3.12*** 3.97 
 (Totimpov85, Rl)      (0.13) 
18 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 83 Robust 0.83 0.86 4.71*** 0.074 
       (0.96) 
19 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 66 Robust 0.08 6.73 3.12*** 6.69 
       (0.03)** 
20 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 54 Robust 0.11 5.93 4.86*** 6.769 
       (0.033)** 
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Table 6.  Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for High20/Low20 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
 Endogenous Dependent Variable:  





























on test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2) 
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Voice and Accountability ( Lcopen, Va) 97 Robust 0.00 107.83** 8.65*** 9.459 
       (0.008)*** 
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Political Stability ( Lcopen, Ps) 89 Robust 0.00 65.24** 8.05*** 5.894 
       (0.052)** 
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, Ge) 90 Robust 0.00 73.53** 8.41*** 5.815 
       (0.054)* 
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 96 Robust 0.00 68.52** 8.33*** 12.546 
       (0.002)*** 
5 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 96 Robust 0.00 92.08** 8.33*** 5.237 
       (0.072)* 
6 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 92 Robust 0.00 69.77** 8.10*** 10.155 
       (0.006)*** 
7 Nominal Trade Shares, Democracy (Lcopen, Demo) 90 Robust 0.00 53.05** 8.71*** 13.916 
       (0.001)*** 
8 Nominal Trade Shares, Autocracy (Lcopen, Auto) 90 Robust 0.00 46.43** 8.71*** 15.919 
       (0.0003)*** 
9 Nominal Trade Shares, Average Years of Schooling (Lcopen, Sch99) 73 Robust 0.00 74.84** 7.34*** 2.624 
       (0.269) 
10 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 62.63** 7.25*** 2.463 
       (0.292) 
11 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 95.07** 2.93** 2.415 
       (0.298) 
12 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 52.35** 2.95** 2.378 
       (0.304) 
13 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 68 Robust 0.00 73.80** 2.78** 2.242 
       (0.326) 
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
        
14 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 71 Robust 0.37 3.14** 5.92*** 1.563 
       (0.457) 
15 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 71 Robust 0.078 6.79** 9.75*** 3.829 
 (Owti, Rl)      (0.146) 
16 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 46 Robust 0.072 6.99** 8.16*** 1.956 
       (0.376) 
17 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 5.55*** 4.602 
 (Totimpov85, Rl)      (0.101) 
18 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 70 Robust 0.846 0.81 9.02*** 1.497 
       (0.368) 
19 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 52 Robust 0.040 8.27** 5.55*** 0.264 
       (0.876) 
20 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 48 Robust 0.046 7.97** 7.37*** 1.791 
       (0.408) 














Journal of Economics and Political Economy 













Table 7. Multiple tests for the relevance and quality of instruments for Mid20 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
 Endogenous Dependent Variable:  































on test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2) 
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Voice and Accountability ( Lcopen, Va) 97 Robust 0.00 107.83** 18.79*** 22.109 
       (0.000)*** 
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Political Stability ( Lcopen, Ps) 89 Robust 0.00 65.24** 19.45*** 13.469 
       (0.0012)*** 
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, Ge) 90 Robust 0.00 73.53** 19.49*** 14.334 
       (0.0008)*** 
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 96 Robust 0.00 68.52** 18.78*** 22.543 
       (0.000)*** 
5 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 96 Robust 0.00 92.08** 18.78*** 11.946 
       (0.0025)*** 
6 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 92 Robust 0.00 69.77** 18.41*** 13.925 
       (0.001)*** 
7 Nominal Trade Shares, Democracy (Lcopen, Demo) 90 Robust 0.00 53.05** 21.00*** 26.038 
       (0.000)*** 
8 Nominal Trade Shares, Autocracy (Lcopen, Auto) 90 Robust 0.00 46.43** 21.00*** 29.529 
       (0.000)*** 
9 Nominal Trade Shares, Average Years of Schooling (Lcopen, Sch99) 73 Robust 0.00 74.84** 26.10*** 0.380 
       (0.827) 
10 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 62.63** 16.67*** 7.951 
       (0.018)** 
11 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 95.07** 17.02*** 8.349 
       (0.015)** 
12 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 52.35** 16.67*** 7.114 
       (0.028)** 
13 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 68 Robust 0.00 73.80** 16.96*** 7.855 
       (0.019)** 
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
        
14 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 71 Robust 0.37 3.14** 19.37*** 0.997 
       (0.607) 
15 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 71 Robust 0.078 6.79** 22.43*** 3.910 
 (Owti, Rl)      (0.142) 
16 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 46 Robust 0.072 6.99** 16.92*** 0.297 
       (0.862) 
17 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 6.77*** 8.673 
 (Totimpov85, Rl)      (0.013)** 
18 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 70 Robust 0.846 0.81 20.23*** 2.144 
       (0.342) 
19 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 52 Robust 0.040 8.27** 6.77*** 1.037 
       (0.597) 
20 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 48 Robust 0.046 7.97** 21.25*** 3.783 
       (0.151) 
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5.2.2. Results on Institutions 
Due to sheer number of specifications for which the regressions are carried out 
for six different dependent variables, it is not possible to present results for both 
institutions and integration together in single table. Thus, in order to cover all 
specifications, we discuss results by summarising them into different categories. 
First we provide results of institutions, divided into 4 categories as Legal, Political, 
Economic and Social. In later sections, results for integration would be separately 
discussed. 
Table 8 provides detailed results on various definitions of institutions. It is 
observed that rule of law and control of corruption are the most relevant 
institutions that help create a more equal society in developed as well as 
developing countries. Democracy also ensures equality by following median voter 
hypothesis. In contrast, Government regulation is relevant for inequality mitigation 
but it is not the most important institution. These results fit nicely with the 
governance policies in developed and developing countries and their welfare 
outcomes. For example, in China inequality trends especially in manufacturing 
pays have been rising that can be partly explained by the Chinese government’s 
early emphasis on strengthening free market economic institutions by introducing 
property rights and promoting more competition domestically and internationally 
within the private sector. Corruption was rampant until recently, when President 
Xi government clamped down on corruption focusing on government officials. 
This step may enable China to have equal distribution of gains among Chinese 
population from private sector induced and export led economic growth. Mamoon 
& Murshed (2017) explains that focus on growth may have led countries like 
China to prioritise development of economic institutions over legal or political 
institutions because economic institutions are more closely related with economic 
growth. However, this trend has been changing recently. More and more 
governments are investing in the development of legal and political institutions.  
5.2.3. Results on integration and inequality 
‘Globalisation and Inequality’ has recently become a hot topic of debate. Trade 
liberalisation is evidently among many of other pro-market measures, which 
countries take to integrate with world markets and thus benefit from factors like 
technological spill-overs. Effects of pro market measures like capital market 
integration and financial liberalisation has already been captured in the last section 
through variables like regulatory quality. The results show that, at best, a weak 
relationship is present between regulatory quality and income distribution or wage 
inequality.  
Mamoon & Murshed (2017) already establishes the importance of trade as a 
key variable of interest in understanding rise and fall in this measure of 
inequalities in developing countries. A brief discussion which has been carried out 
in earlier sections suggests that inequalities (especially skilled bias wage 
inequality) are also rising in developed countries and, other than indigenous 
technical bias, there may be some external factors, which may determine the rising 
trend in inequalities in developed countries, whereas international trade may be an 
important one of such factors.  
Since the inequality models analysed in this chapter many trade measures (both 
outcome based and incidence based), a rich set of information is obtained on the 
link between integration and income or wage inequality for both developed and 
developing countries. This section presents this information referring to many 
specifications already analysed in last section, while focusing only on institutions 
and their effects of inequality. Here the author will analyze the correlations 
between different measures of trade openness and trade policy with Gini and 
Theil99, while institutions would serve as control variables for the robustness of 
the results. The results on the relationship between trade and relative share of 
different income groups will not be covered here to avoid excess of information. 
Nevertheless, openness is found to be significantly related with incomes in 
developing countries. Branko (2005), using Panel data and under a more 
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comprehensive model specifications by adding variables like foreign direct 
investment, looks at the impact of openness on the relative income shares of low 
and high deciles and finds that for poor (least developed) countries openness 
benefits the rich, whereas for countries who belong to relatively higher income 
groups within developing countries, openness does appear to favour poor and the 
middle class.  
Dollar (2005) undertakes a comprehensive study to investigate the effects of 
globalisation on poverty and inequality for the post reform period (1980). Apart 
from showing that poverty trends have declined in developing countries post 1980 
reforms, the paper manages to find no general trend towards higher inequalities 
within developed and developing countries. In comparison, rise in inequalities is 
more pronounced in manufacturing sector pay, though wages only constitute a 
small part of household income in developing countries. The focus of Dollar 
(2005) has been on global inequality which he finds to be on declining trends. 
However, there are many studies who have refuted this claim (i.e, see Milanovic 
2006; 2005; and Wade, 2004). The claims on significant poverty reduction amidst 
high growth rates in developing countries has also been refuted since many studies 
are able to show that excluding India and China from the sample may capture 
rising trends in poverty in many developing countries. Whether developing 
countries, who faced increasing trends in poverty, have been unsuccessful 
globalisers and categorising India and China as success stories of free market 
reform is a generalisation which can then easily be questioned and thus the claim 
that ‘globalisation has been pro poor’ (Milanovic, 2003).  
In this section, the author would look at the issue of within country income 
inequality and its relationship, if any, with international trade while controlling for 
Legal, Political, Economic and Social institutions which have been analysed in last 
section. 
Table 9; show the results for openness with income inequality. There is no 
evidence of a significant relationship between openness and within country income 
inequality except for two cases (columns 3 and 4). Institutions are significantly and 
negatively related with income inequalities. Reducing the sample to developing 
countries only makes insignificance of trade more pronounced.  The relative 
significance of institutions has also declined. Nevertheless, social institutions 
captured by average years of schooling, significantly decrease inequality for 
developing countries and the relationship is significant at 5% level. High values of 
coefficients for Sch99 suggest that education is highly effective in inequality 
mitigation.  Further confidence comes from the statistical validity of the results for 
Sch99 because model specifications (coloumn 6 and 12) with Sch99 do not suffer 
from endogeiniety which has been observed in case of Rl, Va or Ge. (All such 
cases are highlighted in grey) Another interesting observation comes forth. For a 
larger sample, including developed and developing countries, democracy is 
significantly and negatively related with the Gini, telling that democracies are 
more likely to put a downward pressure on income inequality. However when the 
sample is reduced for developing countries only (columns 9 and 10), the signs 
change in favour of autocracy. Now democracy is positively and significantly 
related with Gini and autocracy, which was insignificant for the larger sample, is 
significantly and negatively related with inequality. The result is simple to 
interpret. Democracies in developing countries are associated with higher income 
inequality and autocracies are associated with less income inequality. There are 
several reasons why democratic experience in developing countries is related with 
higher income inequality and why autocracies may in fact show a negative 
relationship.  First and foremost, there is a direct link between democracy and 
higher inequality because there is evidence that transition to a democracy in many 
developing countries have produced political instability, ethnic conflict and 
resultantly poor economic outcomes. (Kaplan, 2000; Zakaria, 2003; and Rodrik & 
Wacziarg, 2005) In literature there is also a distinction between real democracy 
(Populist democracy) and oligarchic society (Acemoglu, 2003b). In real 
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democracy, the political power is more equally distributed among different social 
and income groups of the society and thus the poorer segments can use their 
political voice to implement pro poor tax system in the country. Also in a real 
democracy, implementation of property rights prevent barriers to entry as against 
oligarchic society, which may look like a democracy by holding elections but 
political power lies with economic elites who create monopoly positions in the 
domestic markets for their businesses and violate property rights. In this context, 
an autocratic set up, where the leaders have effectively implemented property 
rights and significantly improved the level playing field for all social groups to 
carry out good business practices, may lead to decrease in income inequality 
(Glaser et al., 2004a; and 2004b). Secondly, as explained by Gradstein et al., 
(2001), culture and social value system also has a very important role to play in 
inequality mitigation: ‘For Muslim, Buddhist/ Hindu and Confucian societies, 
democracy has either hardly discernible, or even a positive, effect on inequality. 
Yet these societies seem to possess some features which make them intrinsically 
more equal that the Judeo-Christian societies. It could be - although our empirical 
test does not account for that -that, the same ‚desired‛ level of inequality which in 
the Judeo-Christian societies is achieved through expanded franchise and 
government-sponsored redistribution, is implemented in the Muslim, 
Buddhist/Hindu, and Confucian societies, informally, through family and ethnic 
ties’ (p35). 
The results in table 9 and 10 give credence to such analysis because results for 
Demo and Auto do not change even if Africa is excluded from the developing 
country sample.  Instead, the results become more pronounced (columns 13, 14, 27 
and 28), with improved coefficients and significance level for both Demo and 
Auto to suggest that the cause of unequal distribution of resources in developing 
countries is much more than the risky transitions to democracy as is also suggested 
by Rodrik (2005). It seems to matter what kind of democracies these developing 
countries implement and practice and what kind of societies they make up.  
Table 10, shows the results based on trade policy (Owti). They are similar to 
the ones already discussed above for Lcopen. For the larger sample of developed 
and developing countries, decrease in tariffs rates on international inputs and 
capital goods bring a significant decrease in income inequality. However, the as 
for Lcopen, results remain highly case sensitive. Owti is only significant for 2 
(columns 17 and 18) specifications out of total number of 14 specifications 
including the ones which represent results for reduced samples (developing 
country only).  On basis of these results we cannot claim with surety that trade is 
significantly related with income inequality.  
 Insignificant results on the relationship between trade and inequality should 
not be taken as evidence in favour of globalisation or against it. What the results at 
best show is that the very construction of Gini, and related methodological 
problems (also mentioned at the start of the chapter), have a part to play in these 
results. Further more, despite the sophistication of the analysis, the major 
deficiency in the kind of analysis done in this section would remain the very 
limited number of observations utilised for Gini against to what has been available 
by WIDER dataset. The author only includes one yearly observation for every 
country to best suite the cross section methodology employed in this manuscript. 
That has significantly decreased the degrees of freedom. This could have been 
avoided under a Panel analysis. For a Panel of countries, observations for Gini go 
as high as 5313.  
However, it is also important to note here is that a panel analysis may not 
necessarily lead to different results as many studies (i.e, Dollar, 2005) have already 
utilised such methodology to find no evidence of significant relationship between 
trade and income inequality. Yet again, such results can always be questioned on 
the basis of model specifications and certain case sensitivities. Finally, similar to 
Dollar (2005), our results contribute to the empirical debate and motivate further 
research into this topic.  
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Table 11 presents results for wage inequality. It is clear that general openness 
indicators as well as trade policy measures lead to higher wage inequality in both 
developed and developing countries. However the only exception is import taxes. 
Implementing import taxes by protecting local industry has egalitarian effects. This 
is in line with recent literature on premature de industrialisation that suggests that 
developed countries have witnessed rise in inequality partly explained by active 
globalisation that has reversed industrialisation and thus causing political and 











Dependent Variable : Gini 
(Developed + Developing) (Developing Only) (Developing Only) Minus Africa 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Openness               
Nominal Trade Shares (Lcopen) -0.49 -2.11 -4.71 -5.22 1.22 -0.59 -0.59 -1.08 -0.10 1.33 -1.26 0.67 -0.93 1.09 
 (-0.2) (-0.8) (-1.6)* (-1.8)* (0.4) (-0.19) (-0.2) (-0.3) (-0.03) (0.37) (-0.3) (0.1) (-0.2) 0.27 
Institutions               
Legal               
Rule of law(Rl) -7.30      -6.44        
 (-5.0)***      (-1.3)        
Political               
Voice and Accountability (Va)  -5.46      1.40       
  (-4.0)***      (0.5)       
Democracy (Demo)   -0.71      1.35    2.28  
   (-1.8)*      (2.4)**    (3.2)***  
Autocracy (Auto)    0.369      -1.59    -2.80 
    (0.7)      (-2.6)**    (-3.5)*** 
Economic               
Government Effectiveness (Ge)     -8.60      7.64    
     (-5.0)***      (0.9)    
Social               
Average years of schooling (Sch99)      3.80      -4.27   
     (-2.7)***      (-2.2)**   
               
N 95 96 89 89 89 72 70 71 66 66 64 52 44 44 
F-Statistics 13.27*** 8.96*** 3.14** 1.67 12.62*** 9.16*** 0.88 0.21 2.87* 3.35 0.44 2.27 5.10* 6.10 
R-Square 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.11  0.19 0.00 0.36 0.34 
               
2SLS Bias 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.208 0.009 0.000 0.000 
Sargan (p) 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.876 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.011*** 0.025** 0.000*** 0.817 0.072* 0.187 
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively; Standard errors corrected for as run Durbin–Wu–Hausman     test (augmented regression test) for 
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Dependent Variable : Gini 
(Developed + Developing) (Developing Only) (Developing Only) 
Minus Africa 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
Trade Policy               
Tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital 
goods (Owti) 
-30.05 3.73 56.50 66.69 -48.34 16.57 -25.02 -18.61 -9.18 -12.46 -32.26 -1.29 3.38 -0.69 
(-1.04) (0.2) (1.9)* (2.4)** (-1.1) (0.6) (-1.1) (-1.10) (-0.5) (-0.7) (-1.1) (-0.1) (0.1) (-0.03) 
Institutions               
Legal -0.45      -7.13        
Rule of law(Rl) (-3.5)***      (-1.3)        
               
Political               
Voice and Accountability (Va)  -5.80      2,61       
  (-2.0)**      (0.80)       
Democracy (Demo)   0.33      1.31    2.34  
   (0.4)      (2.2)**    (2.5)**  
Autocracy (Auto)    -1.13      -1.68    -3.01 
    (-0.9)      (-2.5)**    (-2.8)*** 
Economic               
Government Effectiveness (Ge)     -13.23      -4.01    
     (-2.8)***      (-0.58)    
Social               
Average years of schooling (Sch99)      -2.77      -3.29   
      (-2.6)***      (2.1)**   
               
N 70 71 68 51 68 59 53 54 51 51 51 44 34 34 
F-Statistics 17.07*** 11.80*** 3.57** 2.79* 13.57*** 14.13*** 0.98 1.22 2.79* 3.26** 0.64 2.12 3.16** 3.88** 
R-Square 0.18 0.18 0.59 0.15 0.48 0.06 0.45 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.40 0.57 0.06 0.52 
               
2SLS Bias 0.073 O124 0.155 0.027 0.166 0.051 0.041 0.001 0.027 0.019 0.144 0.029 0.181 0.123 
Sargan (p) 0.036** 0.000*** 0.002** 0.037** 0.028** 0.346 0.027** 0.005*** 0.038** 0.092* 0.009*** 0.504 0.185 0.336 
Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively; Standard errors corrected for as run Durbin–Wu–Hausman     test (augmented regression test) for 
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Table 11. openness / trade policy (All Specifications) 
 Dependent Variable: Theil index 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  
Institutions serve as control variables  and are presented in the parenthesis below 
 ( V a ) ( R l ) ( C t c ) ( R q ) ( G e ) ( P s ) ( D e m o ) ( A u t o ) ( S c h ) 
Independent Variables          
Nominal Trade Shares (Lcopen) 0.032 0.036 0.039 0.029 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.035 0.013 
 (1.54) (1.68)*** (1.77)*** (1.39) (1.82)*** (1.78)*** (1.70)*** (1.41) (0.89) 
Import Penetrations (Impnov85) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0002 
 (2.66)* (2.87)* (2.88)* (2.48)** (3.01)* (2.86)* (2.57)* (2.28)** (0.38) 
Import Penetrations (Impnov85) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0003 
 (2.68)* (2.91)* (2.92)* (2.63)* (3.06)* (2.93)* (2.67)* (2.41)** (0.42) 
TARS trade penetration (Tars85) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0001 
 (2.84)* (3.06)* (3.08)* (2.66)* (3.24)* (3.06)* (2.75)* (2.44)** (0.32) 
TARS trade penetration (Tars85) 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002 
 (2.62)* (2.56)* (2.65)* (2.44)** (2.74)* (2.59)* (2.20)** (1.98)** (0.43) 
Sachs and Warners Openness (Open80s) 0.007 -0.033 -0.025 -0.062 0.052 0.030 -0.007 -0.047 0.047 
 (0.51) (-0.41) (-0.28) (-0.08) (0.46) (0.28) (-0.09) (-0.84) (0.60) 
Tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital 
goods (Owti) 
-0.004 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 
(-0.34) (0.80) (0.89) (1.11) (0.55) (0.37) (-0.96) (-0.63) (0.81) 
Trade taxes (Txtrdg) -0.230 -0.324 -0.302 -0.149 -0.425 -0.366 -0.136 -0.058 -0.129 
 (-1.34) (-1.53) (-1.50) (-0.86) (-1.78)*** (-1.63) (-0.96) (-0.49) (-0.86) 
Total  import charges (Totimpov85) 4.810 2.281 2.504 4.509 2.986 2.441 5.713 4.364 1.079 
 (1.50) (1.84)*** (1.91)*** (1.63) (1.75)*** (2.03)** (1.46) (1.39) (1.76)*** 
Non trade barriers (Owqi) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-2.32)** (-1.82)*** (-1.70)*** (-2.31)** (-1.84)*** (-2.04)** (-2.56)* (-2.33)** (-1.18) 
Non trade barriers (Owqi) -0.800 -1.082 -1.243 -0.522 -1.101 -1.010 -0.487 -0.264 0.050 
 (-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.85) (-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.94) (-1.01) (-0.94) (0.27) 
Non tariff barriers (Ntarfov87) -0.002 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (-1.64) (-0.82) (-0.26) (-1.66)*** (-1.04) (-1.30) (-2.09)** (-2.12)** (-0.73) 









This chapter has analysed the effects of different institutions on inequality. 
Although the literature is limited on the subject, what there is, suggests that there 
are two-way causalities between institutions and inequality. To explore this it was 
necessary to solve the problem of endogeneity by utilising a rich set of instruments 
and employing higher order validation techniques of relevance and exogeniety, 
and thus a very fine econometric analysis is carried out to understand the role of 
good institutions, which represent a vast set of legal, political, economic and social 
outcomes, in inequality mitigation and redistribution. Furthermore, the rich model 
specification also enabled the analysis to shed light on the link between trade and 
inequality which is also subject of great interest for many studies lately.  
The results reconfirmed that good quality institutions lead to decreases in 
inequality. It also appears that voice and accountability and political stability are 
more important than democracy. In line with previous studies, the current findings 
suggest that it may not matter much whether a country is working under a 
democracy or autocracy if it is about income inequality, but good policies enacted 
by the country’s leaders determine the welfare-enhancing effects through 
preservation of property and other rights. Good leadership, which not only follows 
more market friendly policies,  also keeps institutional development at the fore of 
their policy choice and is keen for economic development to succeed. For 
developing countries, transition to democracies also comes with higher risks of 
political stability which in turn lead to greater income inequality. Culture and 
social set up capture democratic outcomes more than democracy itself in 
developing countries. Societies who highly value equality may redistribute income 
from rich to the poor even if the larger political set is autocratic in the country. 
However, autocracies are significantly related with wage inequality, where as 
democracies may pay higher wages on average in the manufacturing sector.  
Table 8 summarises the results of institutions based on relative significance, 
and shows that rule of law, control for corruption, political stability, government 
effectiveness and education are the key institutional outcomes which if secured can 
ensure equal societies. If education is more equally distributed among the 
population, relative wages of skilled and unskilled labour will have the least 
amount of distortions, especially when the country opens up to international trade. 
Among economic institutions, regulation is less important when compared to 
government’s independent fiscal and monetary policy, its effective capacity to 
decentralise and its pro-business orientation. Table 8 also shows that the middle-
class comes out to be the main beneficiary of good quality institutions over any 
other income group as Middle20 equations give the most significant results.  
Regarding integration, the findings indicate that openness generally relates to 
higher wage inequality, although its impact on income inequality is relatively 
insignificant. This result is also in line with recent literature. However, the findings 
strongly suggest that levels of trade or trade policies may carry significant positive 
effects on wage inequality. Especially, international competition by revoking 
import taxes lead to higher wage inequality. To remedy for rising wage 
inequalities in developing countries, the analysis favour more regional trade 
among developing countries where trade may bring labour intensive technical 
change in the economies of participant countries as has been the case in Europe, 
where countries trade among each other more due to the EU (European Union), 
when in comparison with U.S.  For example, in countries like China and India, the 
pace of development suggest that both countries are fast climbing the technology 
ladder and would form significant pockets of services’ sector-oriented high 
technology dependent production areas, which may draw similarities with 
developed nations in both supply and demand and relative factor prices. Trade 
within developing countries may seek to exploit such emerging pockets. Countries 
like Pakistan may also increasingly join in if regional economics is a priority and 
conflicts of interest are resolved or set aside for preparation of economic grounds 
for social harmony within their populations. 
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Table 8. Significance count of institutions 


















Total cases of 
correct signs 
Legal Institutions         
Rule of Law (Rl) 
    (Negative sign) 
10 out of 12 
(10 out of 10) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
10 out of 12 
(0 out of 10) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
10 out of 12 
(10 out of 10) 
53 out of 72 
 
53 out of 53 
 
Control of Corruption (Ctc) 
    (Negative sign) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
8 out of 12 
(0 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
48 out of 72 48 out of 48 
Economic Institutions         
Government Effectiveness (Ge) 
    (Negative sign) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
8 out of 12 
(0 out of 8) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
46 out of 72 46 out of 46 
Regulatory Quality (Rq) 
    (Negative sign) 
4 out of 12 
(3 out of 4)* 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
2 out of 12 
(2 out of 2) 
6 out of 12 
(0 out of 6) 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1)* 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
21 out of 72 19 out of 21 
Political Institutions         
Political Stability (Ps) 
    (Negative sign) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
8 out of 12 
(8 out of 8) 
9 out of 12 
(0 out of 9) 
8 out of 12 
(0 out of 12) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
48 out of 48 48 out of 48 
Voice and Accountability (Va) 
    (Negative sign) 
7 out of 12 
(7 out of 5) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
7 out of 12 
(0 out of 7) 
2 out of 12 
(1 out of 2)* 
7 out of 12 
(7 out of 7) 
33 out of 72 
 
31 out of 33 
 
Democracy (Dem) 
    (Negative sign) 
5 out of 12 
(5 out of 5) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
4 out of 12 
(4 out of 4) 
7 out of 12 
(0 out of 7) 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1)* 
5 out of 12 
(4 out of 5)* 
25 out of 72 23 out of 25 
Autocracy (Aut) 
    (Negative signs) 
1 out of 12 
(1 out of 1) 
3 out of 12 
(0 out of 12) 
0 out of 12 
(0 out of 0) 
3 out of 12 
(3 out of 3) 
2 out of 12 
(0 out of 2)* 
2 out of 12 
(2 out of 2) 
11 out of 72 9 out of 11 
Social Institutions         
Average Schooling Years (Sch) 
    (Negative sign) 
11 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
9 out of 12 
(9 out of 9) 
6 out of 12 
(6 out of 6) 
6 out of 12 
(0 out of 7) 
5 out of 12 
(0 out of 5) 
6 out of 12 
(6 out of 6) 
43 out of 72 43 out of 43 
Cases of Significance (by columns) 64 out of 120 51 out of 120 51 out of 120 68 out of 120 47 out of 120 62 out of 120 - - 
Notes: * Observation made that a variable has entered the equation significantly but with a wrong 
sign; Significance is observed at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Country List for Weighted Average of total Import Charges, 
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